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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a director of a Delaware company whose once 
promising business plan has not worked out as hoped. Faced with a dete-
riorating cash position, the firm must now decide between two courses of 
action. The first option (the “Gamble”) is potentially lucrative but also 
risky with the odds of success estimated at just 25%. Under this option, 
all company assets would be redeployed towards a new business plan 
and, if successful, should result in the sale of the company for $200 mil-
lion. If it fails, however, the company would be left with nothing. The 
alternative option (the “Sure Thing”) is less risky and would involve liq-
uidating the company for $100 million with virtual certainty. Which op-
tion should you support? Which option should society support? 
To those unfamiliar with Delaware law, it may be surprising to 
learn that the answers to these two questions are not necessarily the 
same. From a social welfare perspective, there seems little doubt that the 
Sure Thing (with its expected value of $100 million) is far superior to the 
Gamble (with its expected value of just $50 million).1 For company di-
rectors, however, recent pronouncements by the Delaware judiciary re-
quiring directors to maximize returns to common stockholders make this 
choice dependent on how the firm happened to have financed its opera-
tions.2 If the company financed itself through issuing only common 
stock, the Sure Thing does indeed emerge as the superior option for di-
rectors given that it maximizes common stockholder returns. On the oth-
er hand, if the company happened to have also financed itself with senior 
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 1. Assuming that any private benefits of control associated with continuing the business in the 
Gamble are less than $50 million. Liquidating the business in the Sure Thing, of course, would pre-
clude these private benefits from occurring. For a discussion of how private benefits of control can 
affect the efficiency analysis of such a decision, see infra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
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contract claims (e.g., debt or preferred stock), the Gamble may represent 
directors’ superior option if the proceeds from the Sure Thing would be 
absorbed by these senior claims. In such a situation, only the Gamble 
would provide a chance for common stockholders to realize a return. As 
summarized by the Delaware Chancery Court in analyzing this latter sit-
uation, “the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive in 
good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the corpo-
ration for the benefit of its residual claimants [i.e., common stockhold-
ers] . . . not for the benefit of its contractual claimants.”3 
That directors might be forced to pursue socially suboptimal in-
vestments in these situations is peculiar to say the least. Those familiar 
with corporate finance theory no doubt find this outcome especially per-
plexing. While theories abound for why firms depart from all equity fi-
nancing,4 there is certainly far less consensus on the subject than might 
be expected for a company’s choice of capital structure to dictate that its 
directors support a socially inefficient project.5 More generally, this ap-
proach would also seem to require as a matter of complying with direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties the type of reckless, go-for-broke gambles known 
to plague leveraged firms nearing financial distress and commonly asso-
ciated with the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis. To the extent this is 
the state of Delaware law, it would seem we have come a long way from 
the days when corporations were chartered by the state to pursue the pub-
lic good.6 
This paper’s chief contention is that this puzzling and unfortunate 
state of affairs is the result of several recent Delaware chancery opinions 
that have erroneously confused shareholder wealth maximization as a 
means to maximize firm value with shareholder wealth maximization as 
an end in itself.7 While these opinions correctly note that directors’ duties 
                                                            
 3. In re Trados, Inc., 73 A.3d 17, 40–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). For a thoughtful analysis anticipating 
how prevailing notions of directors’ fiduciary duties might induce directors to take inefficient corpo-
rate actions depending on a company’s choice of capital structure, see Frank Partnoy, Financial 
Innovation in Corporate Law, 2006 J. CORP. L. 799, 806–09 (2006). 
 4. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding 
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORD. L. REV. 1976, 1986–91 (2008) (summarizing finance 
literature). 
 5. See Partnoy, supra note 3, at 808–09 (discussing arbitrariness of privileging common stock 
with fiduciary duties in light of firms’ divergent capital structures). 
 6. See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1635–36 (2011); see also Simeon E. Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the 
Colonies and States, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 236, 251 (AALS 
ed., 1909) (first published in TWO CENTURIES’ GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1901)) (“The Ameri-
can corporation could only come into existence legitimately for the public good.”). 
 7. The analysis that follows focuses on the governance of for-profit firms where it is generally 
assumed that, absent special charter provisions to the contrary, maximizing firm value is a central 
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have been doctrinally tethered to a mandate to maximize the value of the 
corporation for its residual claimants, they err by assuming this mandate 
should be the ultimate benchmark for evaluating all director decisions. 
As shown below, a shareholder wealth maximization norm need not re-
quire this assumption, and the norm can easily be reconciled to situations 
where directors approve the Sure Thing in the earlier hypothetical re-
gardless of a company’s capital structure. 
The mechanism by which this reconciliation is made possible is the 
acknowledgement that the centrality of a board to a company’s business 
strategy makes it a natural venue for investors to bargain over the com-
pany’s future direction. As scholars of “team production” have long 
maintained, directors are commonly called upon to mediate conflicting 
interests within a firm, and central among these conflicting interests are 
those of its investors.8 It is a perspective that informs virtually every 
proxy fight when common stockholders jockey to elect representatives 
that can advance their particular views on a company’s board. And it is 
no less relevant to understanding the dynamic that occurs with fixed-
claim investors such as lenders who, in lieu of securing board representa-
tion, extract from a company’s board various restrictive covenants.9 For a 
board that promises to obtain a lender’s consent before acquiring a busi-
ness or changing its name is effectively binding itself to negotiate with 
the lender in the event it wants to undertake such conduct. 
In either case, both director representation and restrictive covenants 
are merely mechanisms to address an incomplete contracting problem 
faced by all investors. Unable to write a contract that addresses every 
future contingency, investors must write investment contracts that antici-
                                                                                                                                     
goal of a business enterprise. See infra text accompanying note 55 (summarizing court opinions); 
ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (3d ed. 2010) (“The objective in conven-
tional corporate financial theory when making decisions is to maximize the value of the business or 
firm.”); see infra note 13 (defining firm value). As a result of this default rule, where maximizing 
firm value is not the intended goal for a firm, its promoters will generally be required to contract 
explicitly concerning the firm’s ultimate goal or to choose a noncorporate form of organization. E.g., 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1–787, 13.1–626, 13.1–782 (Lexis 2011) (“A benefit corporation shall have 
as one of its purposes the purpose of creating a general public benefit,” and “may identify one or 
more specific public benefits that it is the purpose of the benefit corporation to create. . . . This pur-
pose is in addition to [the purpose of engaging in any lawful business].”). In these latter situations, 
this explicit contracting over a firm’s nonmonetary ends greatly diminishes the concern that is the 
focus of this Article—namely, the risk that courts will mistakenly impute to such a firm a single-
minded objective of maximizing stockholder welfare. 
 8. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (discussing a team production theory of the board of directors that applies to 
publicly traded firms). 
 9. See RICHARD WIGHT ET AL., THE LTSA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 337–88 
(2009) (describing common negative covenants made by borrowers to lenders in credit agreements). 
258 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:255 
pate the need for future renegotiation as circumstances change. From a 
financial contracting perspective, the choice of whether an investor ob-
tains covenants or director representation to force these renegotiations is 
simply a question of whether a security’s cash flows justify concentrated 
oversight and monitoring in anticipation of frequent renegotiation (thus 
pointing toward director-designees) or only periodic oversight in antici-
pation of renegotiation upon certain events (thus pointing toward con-
tract covenants).10 
Appreciating the role of the board in effecting these renegotiations 
highlights the useful role a shareholder wealth maximization norm can 
play in ensuring directors maximize corporate value, but only if this 
norm is viewed as a means to this end. In particular, by creating a back-
ground default rule for how directors should view their fiduciary duties, 
such a norm minimizes transactions costs for initial equity investors 
while inducing future investors to negotiate investment agreements that 
restrict corporate action in those instances where the interests of the in-
vestor and common stockholders are likely to diverge. A classic example 
is a loan covenant prohibiting a borrower from changing its primary line 
of business without the consent of the lender.11 In a world where direc-
tors must (by default) maximize common stockholder returns, a rational 
lender will recognize the incentive a board has to substitute existing cor-
porate assets for riskier ones, thereby resulting in this common negative 
covenant.12 
Rather than constitute an absolute prohibition on modifying busi-
ness lines, however, the covenant operates to force a renegotiation with 
                                                            
 10. For instance, cash flows to equity securities are likely to be more sensitive to operating 
performance than those of fixed claims such as loans. As such, stockholders may be more inclined to 
look for director representation as a means to monitor and/or replace management and to otherwise 
monitor a company’s operating performance. In contrast, creditors may be content to limit renegotia-
tion only upon events that might substantially affect an issuer’s ability to make fixed payments of 
interest and principal. For a formal model of this dynamic, see Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel, 
The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 209 (1996); see also David 
Erkens, K.R. Subramanyam & Jieying Zhang, Affiliated Bankers on Board and Conservative Ac-
counting, 89 ACCT. REV. 1703 (2014) (noting that while banks typically rely on covenant violations 
to protect against agency conflicts with equity holders, banks occasionally “obtain ongoing control 
rights through affiliated banks on boards [to] allow affiliated banks to protect their rights in a timeli-
er manner than through debt covenants”). 
 11. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, at 363 (“Neither the Borrower nor any Subsidiary 
shall engage to any substantial extent in any line or lines of business activity other than [the types of 
businesses engaged in on the date hereof by the Borrower and its Subsidiaries.]”). 
 12. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 338 (1976) (noting the role 
of covenants as a means for bondholders to protect against the incentive managers have to appropri-
ate wealth from bondholders in favor of equity holders). 
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the lender if the company’s board later decides to change its business. 
Critically, as shown below, the board will be able to reach a satisfactory 
renegotiation with the lender only if the board can show that changing 
business lines will maximize the value of the firm.13 Moreover, the same 
analysis applies where an investor has secured this negotiation leverage 
through obtaining a director-designee with board veto rights rather than 
through a loan covenant. In either case, shareholder wealth maximization 
leads to an investor veto right that forces the board and investors to en-
gage in classic Coasian bargaining over whether the company can engage 
in the proscribed conduct. The primary difference is that the appointment 
of the director-designee requires an opting out of the director’s need to 
consider shareholder wealth maximization as the primary means to max-
imize the value of the firm. In so doing, this opting out enables the direc-
tor to consider firm value from the perspective of the investor’s personal 
cash flows. In the parlance of contract scholars, shareholder wealth max-
imization is simply a default rule that investors opt out of by appointing 
their own director-designees.14 
While this analysis tracks in large part a purely contractarian ap-
proach to the firm, it is important to emphasize the role that fiduciary 
duties play in this bargaining process, thus distinguishing it from 
contractarian approaches that advocate a complete abandonment of fidu-
ciary duties.15 First, imposing a fiduciary duty to the firm imbued with a 
                                                            
 13. “Firm value” is defined here in the conventional sense used in corporate finance as all 
future cash flows to the firm discounted to present value. As such, the bargaining model of the board 
described in this paper focuses primarily on bargaining among a firm’s capital providers, as is typi-
cal in corporate finance. At the same time, nothing prohibits other noninvestor stakeholders from 
seeking similar rights to force a renegotiation upon future events that would require directors to take 
into account the need to pay off these noninvestor stakeholders as well as its capital providers. In-
deed, as noted below, it is management’s de facto veto right over the sale of a financially distressed 
firm that often forces boards to create special management incentive plans to motivate managers to 
find an acquisition partner when the acquisition proceeds will be absorbed by investors’ senior con-
tract claims. See infra text accompanying note 62. 
 14. In general, default rules are legal rules that individuals can modify through contract. See 
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 389, 390 (1993) (comparing default rules and immutable rules). One theory of default rules is 
that they are commonly used to lower transaction costs by mimicking what most parties would agree 
to on their own where implementing the default rule is less expensive than negotiation. See Charles 
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligations, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (suggesting that default rules should provide for the 
rule parties would negotiate on their own). When a default rule fails to reflect the bargain desired by 
contracting parties, its existence will induce parties to contract explicitly for a more desirable con-
tract term. See Schwartz, supra, at 399 (noting that default rules are “enacted to solve problems for 
parties, so it follows that parties whose problems are not solved should be free to create their own 
deal”). 
 15. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1309, 1323 (2008) (arguing that directors should “merely be obliged to honor the terms of the 
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default norm of maximizing common stockholder value provides the ini-
tial inducement for investors to bargain for negative covenants and/or 
board representation. At the same time, this default fiduciary duty en-
courages noninvestor designees to continue to place a thumb on the scale 
of common stockholder welfare when considering how to maximize firm 
value in any subsequent renegotiations. In so doing, these directors can 
help disseminate information concerning a company’s full choice set. 
Second, fiduciary duties can help minimize the costs typically asso-
ciated with ex post renegotiation. As with all Coasian bargains, the abil-
ity of parties to reach a socially efficient result depends on the ability of 
parties to overcome transaction costs, including parties’ incentives to 
shade private values or to engage in other forms of strategic behavior that 
often impede negotiation.16 The prospect of renegotiation itself also rais-
es the potential for strategic, opportunistic demands to renegotiate, which 
can adversely affect parties’ ex ante contracting incentives.17 Imposing 
fiduciary duties on directors can help minimize both forms of strategic 
behavior, particularly when these duties are construed as running to the 
corporation itself—an articulation of director duties having an especially 
long pedigree.18 Specifically, while directors might bargain to maximize 
cash flows to a particular constituency (e.g., a preferred stockholder or 
common stockholders), the fact that directors owe an ultimate duty to 
maximize the value of the firm serves as a backstop against directors’ 
ability to privilege a particular constituency over the overriding goal of 
maximizing the value of the enterprise.19 
                                                                                                                                     
firm’s investment contracts”); see also Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of 
Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 379 (2013) (arguing that with respect to constitu-
ency directors, the “choice of [which corporate constituency] benefits from the residual control 
rights of directors should be left to party autonomy”). 
 16. See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 398. 
 17. See infra text accompanying note 39. 
 18. See Sabin Willett, Gheewalla and the Director’s Dilemma, 64 BUS. LAW. 1087, 1097 
(2009) (“Cases in which courts recite that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation are myri-
ad.”); see also infra Part IV. 
 19. In this regard, the ultimate content of a director-designee’s fiduciary duties would resemble 
the analysis of directors’ duties suggested by Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor, which they viewed as 
informing Delaware’s approach to directors elected by preferred stockholders in Oban v. Field, Civil 
Action No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997). See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, 
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV 967, 993 (2006) (“[A] 
preferred-controlled board can make business decisions that serve the preferred at the expense of 
common, as long as those decisions can be defended as in the best interests of the corporation.”). 
This interpretation of Oban, however, was expressly—and in the view of this author, erroneously—
rejected in In re Trados when Chancellor Laster concluded that Fried and Ganor’s interpretation of 
directors’ fiduciary duties “does not comport with how I understand the role of fiduciary duties or 
the ruling in Orban . . . .” In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (2013). 
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Finally, the fact that directors ultimately have a fiduciary duty to 
the firm itself also works to constrain intraboard bargaining to conflicts 
that arise from investors’ differentiated cash flow rights. As illustrated 
below, directors bargaining over these cash flow rights can ordinarily 
justify this behavior as consistent with their fiduciary duties given that a 
successful renegotiation will maximize the value of the firm.20 In con-
trast, the same cannot be said of a director seeking to maximize his or her 
private benefits (such as the personal satisfaction of running a company), 
thus limiting director bargaining to the former class of conflicts.21 
As discussed below, conceptualizing board decisionmaking in this 
fashion would not necessarily alter the outcome of decided cases that 
have used shareholder wealth maximization as an end in itself. Notwith-
standing their articulation of this view of director duties, these cases typ-
ically punish boards for taking actions that make it difficult to conclude 
whether the board has bargained honestly to maximize the value of the 
corporation. In the process, however, the opinions’ sweeping pro-
nouncements about directors’ duties to common stockholders have 
thrown into uncertainty the ability of investors to use director-designees 
to facilitate socially efficient renegotiation. These pronouncements also 
make it equally unclear how directors should comport themselves when 
faced with situations that pit common stockholder value against firm val-
ue. The consequence of these sweeping pronouncements is particularly 
troublesome in light of the tendency of corporate directors and their 
counsel to interpret Delaware case law as guidance on how directors 
should behave in the future.22 As such, a primary goal of this Article is to 
beat back any temptation of corporate directors to view themselves as 
having an immutable duty to maximize common stockholder value and 
to establish how a bargaining model of the board is consistent with both 
economic theory and traditional Delaware case law. Under this model, 
investors can and should use director-designees to promote their finan-
cial interests so long as these directors engage in good faith bargaining 
with other directors to maximize the value of the firm. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the bargaining 
model of the board by mapping the lessons of incomplete contracting 
theory onto the governance structure of ordinary corporations with its 
                                                            
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. Whether or not this bargaining constraint is optimal is beyond the scope of this paper. For a 
discussion of its possible ramifications on social welfare, see text accompanying note 79. 
 22. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text (noting influence of 
recent Delaware case law on the model financing documents of the National Venture Capital Asso-
ciation). 
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emphasis on the board of directors. Part III adds to this contract analysis 
the effect of subjecting directors to fiduciary duties, concluding that 
when properly construed, directors’ fiduciary duties can enhance the 
ability of the board to maximize the value of the firm. Having established 
the bargaining model, Part IV then examines its compatibility with con-
ventional corporate law, with special emphasis on Delaware’s jurispru-
dence. In the process, Part IV highlights how recent Delaware Chancery 
Court opinions potentially undermine the bargaining model of the board 
and, consequently, the ability of Delaware’s corporate law to achieve its 
oft-cited aim of maximizing the value of the corporation. Part V con-
cludes. 
II. A BARGAINING MODEL OF THE BOARD 
The bargaining model of the board used here builds on the large lit-
erature on incomplete contracting that focuses on the critical role of cor-
porate control rights in capital formation.23 This scholarship begins with 
the premise that because of transaction costs, bounded rationality, and 
nonverifiable information, an investor in a firm will ordinarily be unable 
to write a financing contract that addresses every possible contingency.24 
As such, contract renegotiation may be required as the future unfolds. 
While the Coase Theorem suggests such ex post renegotiation should 
result in efficient outcomes, a problem arises in that the party holding 
residual control rights over the firm’s assets might hold up the other par-
ty or otherwise engage in rent-seeking in the course of bargaining.25 
Among other things, this behavior might thwart an efficient renegotiation 
from occurring or produce ex ante inefficiencies such as preventing the 
initial financing contract in the first place.26 As initially set forth by San-
ford Grossman and Oliver Hart,27 one way parties can address this chal-
                                                            
 23. For an overview, see generally Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden, Incomplete Contracts 
and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 
181 (2011). 
 24. See id. at 182. 
 25. Edward M. Iacobucci & George C. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 
VA. L. REV. 515, 560 (2007) (“[Contracting parties] might complete their contract ex post through 
renegotiation, but the ex post bargaining process allows one party to hold up the other—that is, to 
appropriate some of the value created by the other party’s specific investment in their relationship.”). 
 26. Richard Holden & Anup Malani, Renegotiation Design by Contract, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
151, 152 (2014) (“Asset ownership affects this bargaining because it reflects outside options that 
parties to a transaction have if renegotiation breaks down, and this, in turn, affects incentives for ex 
ante relationship-specific investments.”). 
 27. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
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lenge is through explicit bargaining over who holds these residual control 
rights.28 
The bargaining model of the board maps these insights onto the 
structure of corporate law, which vests a corporation’s residual control 
rights in its board of directors.29 As shown below, the result is a model of 
the board where bargaining over board power occurs across a spectrum 
of settings. One end involves settings where a hypothetical investor and 
founder share control of the board to engage in frequent renegotiations 
through their board designees (typical of early-stage venture capital fi-
nance). The other end involves settings where such an investor and 
founder agree to vest one party with control of the board, but the other 
party might secure the right to renegotiate with the board in specific in-
stances (typical of debt finance). 
A. Shared Control 
Consider a private firm (NewCo) founded by a liquidity-
constrained founder (Founder). As with most start-ups, Founder assigns 
to NewCo all legal right to Founder’s business plan, but being liquidity 
constrained, Founder lacks the capital to develop it. Moreover, because 
NewCo’s principal asset is the business plan, NewCo also lacks the abil-
ity to secure traditional bank financing, and Founder’s liquidity con-
straint limits Founder’s ability to overcome NewCo’s lack of bankable 
collateral with a personal guarantee. 
As is well known, an external equity investor (VC) can remedy this 
financing challenge through an array of contractual devices widely used 
in venture capital finance.30 These include the acquisition of a senior eq-
uity security having certain economic preferences such as a priority on 
dividends and a liquidation preference (commonly equal to the VC’s 
original investment amount) that is payable to the VC upon an acquisi-
tion or liquidation of the firm before any payments can be made on the 
company’s common stock. The preferred stock is also convertible into 
shares of common stock to enable the VC to participate in the apprecia-
tion of the firm’s value beyond the VC’s original investment. Often, this 
conversion right may even permit the VC to participate on an as-
                                                            
 28. This “property rights theory” of the firm was further developed in Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1132 (1990). 
 29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,  § 141(a) (2001) (“The business and affairs of every cor-
poration organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 30. See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichot-
omy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 48–56 (2006) (providing an overview of venture 
capital contracting). 
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converted-to-common stock basis in any liquidation proceeds that remain 
following payment of the liquidation preference. Because Founder will 
ordinarily hold shares of common stock, these economic preferences 
provide strong incentives for Founder to execute the business plan while 
also providing downside protection to the VC. 
Critical to the VC investor are four additional mechanisms designed 
to address the considerable risk and uncertainty associated with the fu-
ture cash flows from this investment. Each helps solve the fundamental 
incomplete contracting problem at the heart of the VC’s investment. In 
keeping with standard incomplete contracting framework,31 the overall 
effect of these provisions is to induce Coasian bargaining in future situa-
tions where the interests of the VC and Founder might diverge. 
First, the VC will typically stage its investment over time.32 In addi-
tion to preserving the real option to abandon the investment depending 
on the progress of the business, the continual need for Founder to return 
to VC for funding sets the stage for periodic bargaining between VC and 
Founder as the future unfolds. Similarly, to ensure bargaining with 
Founder in interim situations where the interests of Founder and VC 
might diverge, the VC will secure a variety of stockholder veto rights 
over corporate actions such as selling additional equity securities, alter-
ing the primary line of business, selling the firm, or modifying the char-
ter. Third, to ensure its ability to monitor the business’s progress and fa-
cilitate informed renegotiation, the VC will secure various monitoring 
and information rights, such as the right to receive periodic financial dis-
closures. Finally, to enhance both the frequency and the quality of these 
renegotiations, the VC will also obtain board representation,33 often with 
its director-designee holding specific veto rights over a variety of corpo-
rate actions.34 
This last mechanism deserves special attention, as it is central to 
solving the VC’s incomplete contracting challenge. While VC might at-
tempt to specify stockholder veto rights over all actions that might raise 
VC–Founder conflicts, such a financing contract would still offer inade-
                                                            
 31. See supra text accompanying notes 23–28. 
 32. Each of these mechanisms is described more fully in Bartlett, supra note 30, at 48–56. 
 33. See, e.g., NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, SAMPLE TERM SHEET FOR SERIES A PREFERRED 
STOCK FINANCING 3 (2009) [hereinafter NVCA TERM SHEET], available at 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=75&Itemid=93 
(providing for specific number of “Series A Directors”). 
 34. See, e.g., NVCA TERM SHEET, supra note 33, at 9–10 (providing for Board approval, 
which must include the affirmative vote of the Series A Director, of ten corporate actions including 
changing the principal business of the Company, entering into a strategic relationship involving 
payments in excess of specific amounts, or hiring, firing, or changing the compensation of the execu-
tive officers or approving any option grants). 
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quate protection for the reasons suggested by incomplete contracting 
theory.35 At the same time, a common solution to this problem—giving 
residual control of the firm to VC through allowing it to control the 
board of directors—will be unacceptable to Founder. For instance, 
Founder may have concerns that VC’s senior liquidation preferences will 
induce it to favor a premature sale of the company or that Founder’s li-
quidity constraint will allow VC to issue additional securities to VC and 
not to Founder, diluting Founder’s economic interest. A compromise so-
lution commonly used in venture capital finance is therefore for VC to 
share board control with Founder, often giving a third-party “industry” 
director a tie-breaking vote in the event of a deadlock.36 If an unantici-
pated event occurs, such as the sudden collapse of the company’s product 
market, the VC will therefore have the ability to bargain with Founder 
over how to restructure the business. Likewise, while the ability to obtain 
information concerning the performance of the firm could be done exclu-
sively through periodic disclosures, a VC will be in a far superior posi-
tion to engage in informed bargaining by securing a board position with 
direct access to company management. 
Significantly, securing a board position for the VC also facilitates 
renegotiation at the board level even for those corporate actions over 
which VC obtained specific stockholder veto rights. Since board approv-
al will almost always be required for these actions, any VC–Founder 
conflicts implicated by these actions will first arise in the boardroom and 
become the subject of VC–Founder bargaining in light of the shared con-
trol of the board.37 While one might view this as simply a side effect of 
VCs obtaining board representation, there are good reasons to believe 
                                                            
 35. See supra text accompanying note 24. In addition, Delaware courts have traditionally read 
preferred stock rights narrowly, further limiting the ability of VC to contract expressly over future 
conflicts. See Bartlett, supra note 30, at 105 (analyzing Delaware courts’ approach to interpreting the 
scope of preferred stock preferences). 
 36. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Analysis Of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–89 
(2003) (finding that firms financed by venture capital allocate one-quarter of their board seats to 
third-party directors from within a firm’s industry, with more than half of such firms giving industry 
directors a tie-breaking vote in the event of deadlock between the entrepreneur and VC investors). 
While several papers have sought to model the VC investment contract as representing the contin-
gent-control mechanism studied in Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts 
Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 486 (1992) (see, e.g., William W. 
Bratton Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 891 (2002)), the evidence provided by Kaplan & Stromberg indicates that the dominant control 
arrangement for VCs is the simpler form of shared control. See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of 
Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 470 (2010). 
 37. As noted previously, contract provisions negotiated by VC might also formally require the 
director-designee’s approval of specific corporate actions. See supra note 34. 
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that forcing VC and Founder to renegotiate in the boardroom minimizes 
the primary challenge of using renegotiation to address VC’s incomplete 
contracting problem. In particular, a key tenet of incomplete contracting 
theory is that while using shared control or investor veto rights to facili-
tate future renegotiation can lead to ex post efficient outcomes, these ar-
rangements can also exacerbate ex post holdup problems given that either 
party will have more frequent opportunities to threaten a veto of a pro-
posed course of action and force the firm to a standstill.38 As a result, ex 
post renegotiation rents are likely to be high, potentially undermining 
VC’s or Founder’s incentive to participate in a collaborative venture at 
all.39 By locating this renegotiation within the board of directors, howev-
er, VC and Founder can potentially diminish these holdup problems. As 
Brian Broughman has explained, the common use of industry directors 
within VC-backed firms creates a mechanism to facilitate renegotiations 
that diminishes the risk of opportunistic holdups.40 The reason arises 
from the fact that by holding a tie-breaking vote, such a director can re-
duce holdup risk by moderating each party’s ex post threat position.41 
Thus, rather than view the board as a wholly legal institution that 
must blindly follow a mandate to maximize common stockholder value, 
VCs directly incorporate boards into their contracting model with the 
express purpose of using the board as the central mechanism to induce ex 
post renegotiation between VC and Founder. 
                                                            
 38. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 36, at 486. 
 39. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 27, at 701–04 (demonstrating how ex post renegotiation 
may cause underinvestment ex ante); Aghion & Bolton, supra note 36, at 486 (finding that joint 
control between an investor and entrepreneur results in equilibrium expected investor returns of 
zero). This ex ante incentive problem is likely to be especially acute in investment contexts where 
Founder has substantial bargaining power and, consequently, the ability to extract considerable 
renegotiation rents from VC in any future renegotiation. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 36, at 480–81. 
In contrast, in settings where Founder and VC mutually depend on one another’s firm-specific in-
vestments in the firm, each party will have significant bargaining power, diminishing this concern. 
See id. at n.9 (“[W]here each agent’s financial contribution is similar and where each agent partici-
pates in the management of the business . . . joint ownership may well be the most efficient ar-
rangement.”). To the extent this latter situation more properly characterizes VC investment, it may 
be a further reason why shared control is so often used in VC finance. 
 40. Broughman, supra note 36, at 482–84. 
 41. Under Broughman’s model, VC and Founder must propose actions to the Board, and only 
one proposal will win the approval of the industry director, thereby assuring its adoption. Similar to 
the dynamic at work in final offer arbitration, the competition for the industry-director’s vote induc-
es Founder and VC to offer reasonable proposals that will be favored by the industry director, lest 
the other party’s proposal be adopted. See id.; see also Bratton, supra note 36, at 918–19 (emphasiz-
ing the importance of a tie-breaking vote held by an industry director to induce cooperate renegotia-
tion between Founder and VC). 
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B. Unilateral Control 
While the shared control model has emerged in venture capital fi-
nance as a workable solution to VC’s incomplete contracting challenge, 
it is important to emphasize the conditions that have given rise to its use 
in that setting. In the example involving NewCo, for instance, NewCo 
was a new firm developing a highly uncertain business plan. This re-
quired VC to invest through an equity claim whose cash flows largely 
depended on how the board exercised its residual discretion to adapt in 
an unpredictable future. In light of Founder’s concern with vesting resid-
ual control entirely with VC,42 the result was therefore shared control of 
the board.43 
Absent these conditions, bargaining over board control is likely to 
depart from this structure. For instance, in their seminal article on finan-
cial contracting, Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton examined the condi-
tions under which an entrepreneur and an investor would enter into a fi-
nancing contract where a liquidity-constrained entrepreneur enjoys large 
private benefits from controlling a firm.44 In the case of NewCo, the pre-
ceding discussion ignored the possibility that Founder might enjoy pri-
vate benefits from running NewCo, such as the satisfaction of developing 
an innovative new business. Aghion and Bolton demonstrated that where 
Founder enjoys such private benefits, giving VC either complete or 
shared control of the board will likely be unacceptable to Founder given 
Founder’s liquidity constraint.45 
As an example, imagine a situation where the action that maximizes 
NewCo’s cash flows is to fire Founder as CEO. Because this action max-
imizes the value of NewCo, VC and the industry director are likely to 
support it. In theory, Founder might attempt to negotiate with the other 
directors to work out a bargain where Founder remains in charge, but 
Founder’s lack of liquidity will prevent this arrangement. Anticipating 
this possibility, Founder will therefore resist granting VC any form of 
board control. Yet Founder’s resistance does nothing to address VC’s 
original incomplete contracting problem. Namely, Founder’s retention of 
residual control rights means VC might have to offer up a Coasian bribe 
to ensure Founder maximizes the value of the firm. In fact, considering 
                                                            
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 43. Zenichi Shishido, The Incentive Bargain of the Firm and Enterprise Law: A Nexus of Con-
tracts, Markets, and Law, in ENTERPRISE LAW: CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND LAWS IN THE U.S. AND 
JAPAN 1, 9 (2014) (describing the bargaining challenge facing a venture capitalist and a founder as 
one that requires a mechanism to “motivate each . . . to invest their respective monetary and human 
capital”). 
 44. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 36, at 475–90. 
 45. Id. at 483–84. 
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Founder’s private benefits, the amount of this Coasian bribe might have 
to be considerable. 
Given VC’s expectation of achieving a return on its investment (re-
ferred to as VC’s “participation constraint”), Aghion and Bolton demon-
strated why allowing Founder to have permanent control of the board 
may therefore be infeasible for many VCs.46 They also showed that one 
alternative is to give Founder control of the firm contingent on an exter-
nal signal that is correlated with states of the world where it is socially 
optimal for Founder to retain residual control rights.47 In particular, the 
arrangement resembles the contingent control mechanism seen in debt 
contracts where Founder remains in control of NewCo so long as NewCo 
is not in default.48 Gordon Smith has also documented how staged fi-
nancing in VC finance might also be a mechanism for shifting control of 
the board entirely to VC investors when a firm becomes distressed.49  For 
instance, in “down-round” financings of venture-backed companies,50 a 
firm’s VCs may obtain so much control of the board that they effectively 
dominate board voting. In this regard, one might view such firms as tran-
sitioning between shared control to VC control where a firm becomes 
distressed.51 
Finally, Aghion and Bolton demonstrated that where an investor 
can anticipate certain actions that pose a conflict between an investor and 
an entrepreneur, the contingent control model can be improved by in-
cluding investor veto rights over these actions.52 Specifically, they 
showed that control allocations without any action restrictions on the 
entrepreneur are more likely to provide large renegotiation rents to the 
                                                            
 46. Id. at 481–82. 
 47. Id. at 484–86. For instance, in the example used here, the financing contract would guaran-
tee that control of the Board shifted from Founder to VC when the total returns to VC and Founder 
(including Founder’s private benefits) associated with firing Founder exceed those when Founder 
remains as CEO. 
 48. Id. at 486. 
 49. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 337 
(2005). 
 50. A down-round financing represents a financing transaction in which the pre-transaction 
valuation of the start-up company is less than the valuation of the company immediately following 
its last round of financing. Because of the lower valuation used in the new financing, nonparticipat-
ing stockholders are likely to have their voting interests significantly diluted when a company seeks 
to raise a significant amount of capital. See Bartlett, supra note 30, at 82–90 (describing down-round 
financings). 
 51. Smith, supra note 49, at 327 (“Control is thus contingent only in the sense that it shifts 
from common stockholders to preferred stockholders over successive stages of financing, and this 
can occur either because the venture capitalists bargain for additional seats on the board or because 
the venture capitalists acquire a majority voting stake in the company.”). 
 52. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 36, at 486–90. 
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entrepreneur who undertakes these conflict-laden actions.53 While an 
investor can bargain ex post with the entrepreneur to avoid these actions, 
the need to make an ex post payoff to the entrepreneur will make it hard-
er for the investor to meet its ex ante participation constraint than if some 
action restrictions had been specified in the initial contract.54 In effect, 
these specific veto rights simply change the distributional consequences 
for a firm to propose a restricted action: if the entrepreneur-controlled 
board wishes to undertake it, a Coasian bribe may now have to be paid to 
the investor. 
As in the context of early-stage venture capital finance, bargaining 
for unilateral board control can represent an alternative mechanism for 
addressing an investor’s incomplete contracting challenge. The primary 
difference is that the circumstances surrounding a particular investment 
may induce the investor and Founder to vest control of the board with a 
particular party either permanently or on a contingent basis. 
III. DIRECTOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BARGAINING MODEL OF THE 
BOARD 
So far, the analysis has focused on describing how investors com-
monly use the board of directors to solve an incomplete contracting prob-
lem. In this regard, the analysis has been a straightforward application of 
incomplete contracting theory to the legal structure of the corporation. A 
potential wrinkle with this approach, however, is that the bargaining en-
vironment used in the incomplete contracting literature assumes a free-
dom of contract regime where parties maximize their individual interests 
and, in the process, maximize social welfare. Directors, however, are 
subject to fiduciary duties whose ultimate goal is commonly articulated 
as the maximization of firm value (as opposed to social welfare).55 
                                                            
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 489. 
 55. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
101 (Del. 2007) (observing that directors of a firm “‘comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by 
selecting and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s val-
ue’”) (quoting Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004)); 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 204 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff’d, 931 
A.2d 438 (Del. 2007) (“Even when the company is insolvent, the board may pursue, in good faith, 
strategies to maximize the value of the firm.”); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 
A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm’s 
creditors, the board would, in that scenario, ordinarily be free to take economic risk for the benefit of 
the firm’s equity owners, so long as the directors comply with their fiduciary duties to the firm by 
selecting and pursuing with fidelity and prudence a plausible strategy to maximize the firm’s val-
ue.”); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613, 1157 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“[T]he MGM board or its executive committee had an obligation to 
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Moreover, these duties are frequently articulated as requiring directors to 
act in the best interests of the corporation through maximizing returns to 
the residual claimants: the common stockholders.56 As such, fiduciary 
duties would seem to be a suboptimal constraint on the bargaining model 
of the board given the freedom of contract paradigm used in incomplete 
contracting theory. 
The imposition of fiduciary duties on directors, however, can easily 
be incorporated into the bargaining model subject to an important condi-
tion. In particular, we will need to assume that private benefits of control 
are small or nonexistent.57 With this condition in place, imposing a fidu-
ciary duty on directors that runs to the corporation then becomes entirely 
consistent with the bargaining model even if directors seek to advance 
their individual cash flow rights. Nor does the result change if we add to 
directors’ mandatory fiduciary duty to the corporation a norm of maxim-
izing common stockholder value, so long as this norm is viewed as a de-
fault means to maximize firm value. Indeed, imposing on directors fidu-
ciary duties with this default norm can enhance the ability of the bargain-
ing model to maximize firm value. 
To illustrate this result, return again to the setting involving 
NewCo, Founder, and VC, and assume that Founder has no private bene-
fits of control. Further assume that NewCo successfully obtains from VC 
an initial $120 investment in NewCo’s Series A Preferred Stock for $1 
per share. The investment results in VC holding 120 shares of the Series 
A Preferred Stock, which convert into Common Stock on a 1:1 basis. 
The terms of the Series A Preferred Stock provide for a $120 liquidation 
preference, along with the right to participate on an as-converted basis in 
any remaining proceeds in an acquisition of the company. Assuming 
there are 120 shares of Common Stock outstanding (held by Founder and 
early investors), VC and Common Stockholders would therefore split 
any remaining acquisition proceeds 50/50. VC also obtains stockholder 
veto rights over certain corporate actions (including future financings 
and a sale of the company) and secures the right to appoint a NewCo di-
rector. Finally, Founder and VC agree to share control of the board with 
a third “industry” director who they will appoint by mutual agreement. 
                                                                                                                                     
the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good 
faith effort to maximize the corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (noting that “directors must continue to discharge 
their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in 
the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners” (emphasis added)). 
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Common Stockholders to motivate Founder (and perhaps other members 
of management) to secure such a transaction.62 
This example is, of course, simply an illustration of Coasian bar-
gaining triggered by the conflicting incentives of Common Stockholders 
and VC with respect to continuing NewCo. What complicates the picture 
is that VC is on the board of directors and is demanding a Coasian bribe 
in the form of additional equity from Common Stockholders. When VC’s 
director-designee votes to approve the financing, the designee will there-
fore be approving a transaction that appears to be focused on maximizing 
VC’s returns. Fortunately, directors’ fiduciary duties are flexible enough 
to permit this behavior provided VC’s director-designee can comply with 
well-known procedural safeguards involving conflicted director transac-
tions. In Delaware, for instance, such transactions are permitted if ap-
proved by an informed majority of disinterested directors or stockholders 
or VC’s director-designee can otherwise establish that the “transaction is 
fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved, or rati-
fied, by the board of directors . . . .”63 
To be sure, having to demonstrate that a transaction is intrinsically 
fair to the corporation is no small affair. The standard method courts use 
to ascertain whether a transaction meets this test is for the conflicted di-
rector to demonstrate both fair dealing and fair price.64 Without question, 
this procedural process will constrain the VC director’s freedom of ac-
tion when bargaining with Founder, but significantly, it does so in a way 
that would appear to respond to a primary drawback of ex post renegotia-
tion—that is, the risk of an opportunistic holdup. Knowing that her ac-
tions will need to satisfy either the fair dealing/fair price test or be ap-
proved by a vote of disinterested directors, VC’s director-designee will 
be motivated to temper any threats to walk away from the negotiation 
table in hopes of extracting more of the $10 of surplus. Accordingly, ra-
ther than undermining the bargaining model of the board, the existence 
of this procedural requirement can be viewed as addressing one of the 
model’s principal limitations. 
What about the oft-cited notion that a director’s duty runs to the 
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants?65 Considering that 
Common Stockholders were originally faced with the prospect of a zero-
                                                            
 62. See Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-
Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384 (2010) (documenting this practice in a sample of VC-backed 
start-up companies).  
 63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2010).   
 64. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1510 (2014) (describing intrinsic fairness test). 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
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return liquidation of NewCo, the approved financing certainly improves 
the value of common stock. But does it maximize its value? Total surplus 
from financing the company is $10 compared to $9 being paid to Com-
mon Stockholders. Presumably, the $1 difference is the price VC re-
quired to do the deal. But subjecting directors to a requirement that they 
maximize common stockholder value leaves the transaction vulnerable to 
a claim that the price was higher than necessary. The situation is even 
more problematic in the alternative scenario where the decision that max-
imizes firm value is to liquidate. In that scenario, financing NewCo 
would lead to a 50% chance of selling the firm for $160 and a 50% 
chance of liquidating it for $60. Because there would be a total of only 
$140 of liquidation preference after the proposed financing, only a deci-
sion to fund NewCo would leave Common Stockholders with a chance 
of seeing some return on their shares. If VC’s director-designee votes to 
liquidate NewCo in this scenario (the decision that maximizes firm val-
ue), would that be consistent with a fiduciary duty to maximize the value 
of the residual claim?66 
One might reasonably respond to this issue by returning to the fact 
that fiduciary duties run first and foremost to “the corporation.”67 As 
long as the VC director ultimately acts to maximize the value of the firm 
(e.g., by approving a liquidation in the last scenario), that should be con-
sistent with this duty.68 Cases suggesting directors discharge this duty for 
the benefit of common stockholders could then be confined to ensuring 
that any bargaining surplus is maximally distributed to common stock-
holders in the event of Coasian bargaining. As such, VC’s director-
designee would only have to worry about its duty to common stockhold-
ers where a Coasian bribe is paid or received to ensure firm value is max-
imized. 
Of course, this returns us to evaluating the $1 payment VC received 
in the scenario where it was optimal to finance NewCo. In theory, a court 
might try to operationalize a director’s duty to common stockholders in 
this situation by comparing the $1 to what would be received in a pre-
sumably “fair” bargain, perhaps by resorting to some criteria like the 
                                                            
 66. See Willett, supra note 18, at 1087 (classifying such a scenario as posing a “directors’ 
dilemma” in light of director’s duties to shareholders). 
 67. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
101 (Del. 2007) (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”). 
 68. See, e.g., D.J. Baker, John Butler, Jr. & Mark A. McDermott, Corporate Governance of 
Troubled Companies and the Role of Restructuring Counsel, 63 BUS. LAW. 855, 870 (2008) (arguing 
that in such a setting, directors’ duty of care to the corporation “may require consideration and pur-
suit of business options that are more conservative than those that may otherwise be considered and 
pursued by a healthy corporation” (emphasis in original)). 
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Nash Bargaining Solution.69 Since such a benchmark would suggest VC 
would be entitled to $5 of the surplus,70 the meager $1 payment to VC 
thus seems like the transaction is more than fair to Common Stockhold-
ers. But even the Nash Bargaining Solution rests on critical assumptions 
that make it an unreliable benchmark for evaluating real-life Coasian 
trades, such as the assumption that parties have equal bargaining pow-
er.71 The central problem is that the fairness of the side payment to VC is 
ultimately a function of the bargaining process between VC and Founder. 
However, this bargaining process is already being policed for opportun-
ism and hold-out threat through the procedural requirement that the 
transaction be fair to the corporation.72 So long as parties bargain honest-
ly and in good faith, imposing an additional requirement that the ultimate 
bargain be “fair” to common stockholders simply adds nothing new to 
the process. Meanwhile, courts that try to enforce such a requirement by 
way of an objective benchmark will risk disrupting fairly negotiated bar-
gains. 
In short, there seems little reason for directors to have an immutable 
duty to maximize common stockholder value in the bargaining model of 
the board. The same, however, cannot be said of using shareholder 
wealth maximization as the default means for how directors can maxim-
ize the value of the firm. The primary reason relates to the oft-noted chal-
lenge of imposing on the board a simple duty to maximize the value of 
the corporation.73 As summarized by Chancellor Laster, 
Among other problems, such an approach does not explain why 
the duty to maximize enterprise value should encompass certain 
contract rights (those of preferred) but not others (those of credi-
                                                            
 69. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) postulates that under certain conditions two negotiat-
ing parties will settle for an equal split of the surplus created by their cooperation in reaching a bar-
gain. See Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Eco-
nomic Modelling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176, 177 (1986). In recent years, courts have utilized the NBS 
as a benchmark for what constitutes a fair, hypothetical bargain. Most notably, some courts have 
used the NBS as a mechanism to determine the amount of a reasonable royalty payment in patent 
infringement suits. See Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Dam-
ages, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 662–64 (2014) (summarizing cases). 
 70. Recall that the total surplus was $10 in the scenario where VC agreed to fund NewCo.   
 71. Where differences exist in parties’ bargaining power, the split of surplus will be uneven 
and will favor the party with greater power. For a general treatment of the Nash Bargaining Solution 
and a discussion of applications that endogenize bargaining power, see ABHINAY MUTHOO, 
BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS 9–39 (1999). 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
 73. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577–84 (2003) (“The alternative to following the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm would, on the other hand, force directors to struggle with indeterminate 
balancing standards.”). 
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tors, employees, pensioners, customers, etc.).  Moreover, while 
tolerably clear in the abstract and sometimes in real-world set-
tings, the enterprise value standard ultimately complicates rather 
than simplifies the difficult judgments faced by directors acting 
under conditions of uncertainty . . . . The enterprise value stand-
ard compounds the number of valuation alternatives that must be 
solved simultaneously and the resulting multivariate fiduciary 
calculus quickly devolves into the equitable equivalent of a con-
stituency statue with a concomitant decline in accountability.74 
Even in a setting where a corporation’s only investors are common 
stockholders, a simple mandate for directors to maximize the value of the 
firm will therefore require ex ante contracting by stockholders to ensure 
that the board uses its discretionary authority to maximize cash flows to 
the firm for the benefit of common stockholders (as opposed to, for in-
stance, employees or the board itself).75 Given the transaction costs of 
such ex ante contracting, a default norm of maximizing common stock-
holder value can represent a desirable standard for how directors can sat-
isfy their fiduciary duty to the corporation.76 In other words, a norm of 
common stockholder maximization functions as a type of majoritarian 
default rule that minimizes ex ante transaction costs for a central class of 
investors in a common setting—the formation of a basic corporation.77 
                                                            
 74. In re Trados, Inc., 73 A.3d 17, 41 n.16 (Del. Ch. 2013); see also Bainbridge, supra note 73, 
at 581 (“[A]bsent the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the board would lack a determinate 
metric for assessing options.”). 
 75. See Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 577–84 (discussing hypothetical bargain between board 
and shareholders and explaining why shareholders would insist on a shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm because absent such a norm, boards cannot be held accountable for taking self-interested 
transactions and can otherwise advance the interests of corporate constituencies that “leave share-
holders worse off”). 
 76. See id. at 583 (noting that, because of the transactions costs of contracting over the content 
of directors’ fiduciary duties, “society appropriately adopts the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm as a governing principle—it is the majoritarian default that emerges from the hypothetical 
bargain”). 
 77. Viewing the shareholder wealth maximization as a default rule for directors is common 
among corporate legal scholars subscribing to a contractarian view of corporate law. See, e.g., 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
36 (1991) (“For most firms the expectation is that the residual risk bearers have contracted for a 
promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their 
stock.”); Bainbridge, supra note 73, at 583 (describing shareholder wealth maximization norm as a 
“majoritarian default” rule for directors’ fiduciary duties); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an 
Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 185 (2008) (“[T]he default rule 
is clearly that the corporate contract calls for the firm to maximize value for shareholders consistent 
with its other obligations under the law, as well as to employees, suppliers, customers, and other 
firms and individuals with which the firm is in contractual privity.”); Bernard S. Sharfman, Why 
Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387, 407 (2012) (“[E]ven if the 
firm cannot make the contracts complete, most corporate law contractarians would still argue that 
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Moreover, as with all majoritarian default rules, its existence should 
induce the aforementioned contracting over board discretion where 
common stockholder interests are likely to diverge from those of other 
investors or corporate constituencies.78 In this light, negative covenants 
in bond indentures, VC board veto rights, and even collective bargaining 
agreements can all be viewed as efforts to opt out of this default norm. 
As a corporation navigates an uncertain future, such provisions ensure 
that its board will engage in Coasian bargaining rather than ruthlessly use 
its residual control rights to maximize common stockholder welfare. 
Again, rather than disrupt the bargaining model of the board, the conven-
tional articulation of a board’s fiduciary duties can be entirely consistent 
with it. 
Yet while there is general compatibility between the bargaining 
model and board fiduciary duties, there is one class of cases where this 
compatibility breaks down. Recall that in our example with NewCo, we 
assumed that Founder experienced no private benefits of control. If in-
stead Founder obtains more than $10 of private benefits by continuing 
NewCo, it becomes socially optimal for VC to finance NewCo even in 
the scenario where cash flows to the firm are maximized by liquidating 
it. Under the bargaining model, Founder may therefore try to make a side 
payment to VC to induce VC to finance the company.79 Such a payment, 
however, will likely be problematic in light of Founder and VC’s immu-
table fiduciary duty to the corporation and their corresponding duties of 
loyalty. This modified hypothetical highlights how defining directors’ 
fiduciary duties as running to the corporation potentially interferes with 
board bargaining in those situations where the board’s residual control 
can affect parties’ private benefits. As such, this restriction limits the 
                                                                                                                                     
shareholder wealth maximization must be the default rule because the gaps in the shareholder con-
tract are significantly greater than found in the contracts of other parties contracting with the firm.”). 
 78. See supra note 14. Notwithstanding the common depiction of shareholder wealth maximi-
zation as a default rule of corporate law, see supra note 77, there is a tendency among many scholars 
to view it as mandatory in practice. For instance, while Stephen Bainbridge describes the norm as a 
“majoritarian default,” see supra note 76, he treats it as a mandatory rule insofar that it does not 
appear to be a norm that any director can opt out of by agreement with a corporation’s shareholders. 
Others view the norm as a true default that can be altered by agreement, but they focus on whether 
the board as a whole can opt out of the duty so as to enable the corporation to pursue a goal other 
than profit maximization. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 77, at 185 (“The goal of profit maximization 
for shareholders is the law, but it is only a default rule. If the shareholders and the other constituents 
of the corporate enterprise could agree on some other goal for the corporation, then the law clearly 
should not interfere.”). However, as suggested in the bargaining model of the board, one might want 
a corporation to maximize profits but nevertheless want to opt out of the norm that every director 
must maximize returns to common stockholders. 
 79. Assuming, of course, that Founder has sufficient liquidity to make such a payment. See 
supra text accompanying notes 44–45. 
278 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:255 
compatibility of the bargaining model and a board’s fiduciary duties to 
those settings where private benefits are presumed to be small or nonex-
istent. While the imposition of fiduciary duties can therefore raise some 
efficiency losses where this condition fails to hold, creating an immuta-
ble duty for directors to focus on the best interests of the corporation pre-
sumably produces offsetting benefits that have justified this long-
standing policy.80 
IV. THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE BARGAINING MODEL WITH CURRENT 
TRENDS IN CORPORATE LAW 
Based on the preceding discussion, the bargaining model of the 
corporation has two important implications for corporate law: one con-
ceptual and one doctrinal. First, as a conceptual matter, the bargaining 
model of the board resembles Blair and Stout’s team production theory 
insofar that it poses a challenge to the standard agency account of the 
board as an institution that is—and should be—independent from man-
agement with a focus on maximizing returns to common stockholders.81 
While the bargaining model may very well yield a result that maximizes 
                                                            
 80. While examining the overall efficiency consequences of directors’ duties to the corporation 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that even if the average effect of this constraint 
is optimal for firms in general, there may very well be cases where the constraint is inefficient. As-
sume, for instance, that the primary benefit of having an absolute duty of loyalty to the corporation 
rests in deterring misappropriation of corporate assets by a company’s founder. See Robert Cooter & 
Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991). To the extent this rule also prohibits ex post efficient renegotiations 
that allow a founder-director to capture large private benefits of control, its overall effect on social 
welfare will depend on the size of founder’s private benefits relative to these deterrence benefits. 
Moreover, where there are opportunity costs associated with the founder’s participation in the firm, 
prohibiting such bargaining might also create ex ante inefficiencies by violating founder’s participa-
tion constraint, as might be the case if the prospect of private benefits is required to compensate the 
founder for her opportunity costs. See Brian J. Broughman, Independent Directors and Shared 
Board Control in Venture Finance (Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1123840, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1123840. Given the founder-
specific character of these efficiency losses, the overall effect on social welfare of imposing this 
bargaining constraint can therefore be expected to vary across firms. For similar reasons, where 
founders have large private benefits of control, the inability to protect these private benefits in fu-
ture, unknown board-level bargains may induce founders to turn to organizational forms (such as 
limited liability companies) where founder-directors are not necessarily prohibited from consuming 
and/or protecting private benefits. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How 
Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tension Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 761 (2008) (noting that if fiduciary duty standards in corporation law are not sufficiently flexi-
ble to afford constituency directors discretion to vote their personal interests, constituents may wish 
to invest in an alternative entity governed by other law that will accommodate their needs). For an 
example of how directors’ fiduciary duties can restrict directors from consuming private benefits, see 
infra text accompanying notes 114–142. 
 81. Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 290 (critiquing “the prevailing grand-design principal–
agent” paradigm of the board in which “directors are agents of the firms shareholders”). 
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common stockholder value, such a result will be a function of how a cor-
poration’s investors and other stakeholders bargain over the board’s re-
sidual control rights rather than a function of an immutable mandate that 
the board maximize stockholder welfare. 
At the same time, the model also challenges Blair and Stout’s thesis 
that the board is—and should be—a neutral, unbiased decisionmaker 
who balances the interests of all affected by the corporation.82 Although 
bargaining among corporate constituents may in fact force directors to 
consider the interests of a variety of corporate stakeholders, directors will 
advance the interests of a particular investor by virtue of either an ex-
press relationship (e.g., to a VC) or by a default norm of promoting 
common stockholder value. As a purely descriptive matter, this recon-
ceptualization of the board helps explain why in practice investors do not 
necessarily rely on the board to mediate conflicts but instead negotiate 
for express veto rights, board representation, or both in private and pub-
lic company settings.83 
While the bargaining model helps explain how boards are used in 
practice, the normative desirability of this model hinges critically on how 
well directors manage the risk of holdup and opportunistic renegotiation. 
Here, the model suggests a simple but critical role for corporate law 
through legal institutions that reduce transaction costs and police against 
aggressive bargaining where this risk is likely to be high. As discussed in 
Part III, directors’ fiduciary duties play a key role in serving this function 
given the enhanced likelihood of deadlock and opportunism that arises 
when investors seek to address the incomplete contracting challenge 
through periodic intraboard bargaining.84 For reasons discussed earlier, 
                                                            
 82. Id. at 291 (“Like trustees—whom the law permits to represent beneficiaries with conflict-
ing interests—directors are allowed free rein to consider and make trade-offs between the conflicting 
interests of different corporate constituencies.”). 
 83. See Sepe, supra note 15, at 335–40 (documenting use of constituency directors across 
firms). 
 84. Outside of the insolvency context, investor bargaining over the board’s residual control 
rights has traditionally been subject to less judicial oversight where investors seek to renegotiate 
rights purely through (non-director) contractual restraints on board discretion, such as negative loan 
covenants. So long as the board acts on an informed basis and directors are not affiliated with the 
investors, courts have deferred to the board’s decision to renegotiate such terms under the business 
judgment rule while allowing the parties to bargain as in any ordinary contract setting. See, e.g., 
Katz v. Oak Idus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that bond indenture amendment 
obtained through allegedly “coercive” exchange offer is a permissible means for corporate issuers to 
renegotiate bond agreements given that bondholders are owed no fiduciary duties outside of insol-
vency); but see infra text accompanying notes 107–111 (examining argument that board owes fidu-
ciary duties to creditors in the “zone of insolvency”). The refusal of courts to undertake a more 
searching review of such bargains (despite frequent invitations to do so) generally rests on a pre-
sumption that inducing better contract drafting to obtain renegotiation leverage is preferable to the 
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however, this approach to addressing dysfunctional bargaining will in-
duce directors to maximize firm value only if directors’ duties to maxim-
ize common stockholder value are viewed as a means to the ultimate end 
of maximizing firm value. As shown below, however, recent Delaware 
case law suggests courts are increasingly confusing means and ends, with 
potentially serious ramifications for the ability of boards to make value 
maximizing decisions. 
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means to an End in Corporate 
Law 
Before exploring these recent cases, it is first worth exploring the 
role that shareholder value maximization has traditionally played in cor-
porate law, with a special focus on Delaware. As illustrated here, long-
standing case law is consistent with the theoretical account set forth in 
Part III, in which courts viewed shareholder wealth maximization as a 
means to maximize firm value. As such, recent cases in Delaware depart-
ing from this approach should be viewed as doctrinal innovations. 
In an important article, Gordon Smith analyzed the history of the 
shareholder primacy norm in corporate law where he demonstrated that 
the earliest articulation of the norm appeared in what would today be 
viewed as minority oppression cases.85 In examining whether directors 
could be personally liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties to minori-
                                                                                                                                     
costs of judicial interference. See Katz, 508 A.2d at 879 (“[I]f  courts are to provide protection 
against such enhanced risk, they will require either legislative direction to do so or the negotiation of 
indenture provisions designed to afford such protection.”). In contrast, this presumption against legal 
intervention in ex post investor bargaining collapses for insolvent firms given the considerable costs 
that rent-seeking behavior can pose when investors seek to reorganize a failing firm. Indeed, it is for 
this reason that the bankruptcy system provides both judicial oversight of investor bargaining and 
institutional processes designed to minimize the transaction costs associated with having dispersed, 
unsecured creditors. See, e.g., In re A & C Properties, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986) (court 
reviewing bankruptcy settlement must focus on the existence of good faith negotiations among 
creditors that resulted in a settlement maximizing the size of the estate). For similar reasons, recent 
trends involving distressed debt investing that have undermined this traditional approach to coalition 
building among creditors have led to no shortage of proposed interventions to ensure creditor bar-
gaining is consistent with maximizing firm value. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmus-
sen, Anti-bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 669 (2010) (examining how the combination of lower 
transactions costs in bankruptcy and the emergence of sophisticated distressed debt investors have 
led to an “empty core” problem that impairs coalition formation among creditors); Jonathan C. Lip-
son, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1073 
(2011) (examining how courts can use the doctrine of good faith to police against opportunism in 
multilateral negotiations among creditors and debtors); Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi Venezze, A 
Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach to Creditor Conduct, 112 MICH. L. REV. 59 (2013) (ana-
lyzing how innovative capital market instruments can ensure that creditors have interests that are 
aligned with maximizing firm value). 
 85. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). 
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ty stockholders, courts frequently evoked the language of trusts to ana-
lyze directors’ duties.86 According to these cases, just as a beneficiary 
had standing to bring claims against a trustee, so too could a stockholder 
bring a fiduciary duty claim against directors. These cases made clear 
that shareholders were the beneficiaries of directors’ conduct.87 
In addition to establishing the possibility for directors to be directly 
liable to shareholders, however, these early cases also made clear that 
directors had a related—and seemingly superior—obligation to protect 
the value of the corporation itself. As stated in 1832 in Taylor v. Miami 
Exporting Co.:88 
I look upon it as clear, that all corporation are trustees for the in-
dividuals of which they are composed, and that those who act for 
the corporation and conduct its affairs, are trustees for the corpo-
ration and can not [sic] appropriate the corporate funds to their 
individual advantage, to gratify their passions or to serve any 
other purposes than those for the general interest of the corpora-
tion and its creditors. 
By the 1930s, this view of director duties would ultimately find its ex-
pression in the seminal Delaware case of Loft, Inc. v. Guth.89 In holding a 
director liable for appropriating a corporate opportunity, the court used 
the now classic incantation that directors’ fiduciary duties run to “the 
corporation and its shareholders.”90 
While cases alleging director self-dealing such as Loft v. Guth in-
volved situations where there was a perfect correspondence between the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, other cases indicated 
that where the two potentially diverged, directors could satisfy their fidu-
ciary duties through establishing that their conduct was in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. Indeed, such an outcome occurred in Dodge v. 
Ford91—perhaps the most commonly cited case for articulating the 
shareholder primacy norm.92 As is well known, the facts of the case in-
volved an allegation that the board of the Ford Motor Company breached 
its fiduciary duties by withholding payment of special dividends in favor 
of pursuing a significant expansion of the company’s business opera-
                                                            
 86. Id. at 301. 
 87. Id. at 306–07. 
 88. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 166 (1831). 
 89. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 90. Id. at 238. 
 91. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 92. See Smith, supra note 85, at 278. 
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tions. In requiring the company to declare a dividend, the case famously 
declared: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for 
the benefit of the stockholders. The powers of directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exer-
cised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not ex-
tend to a change in the end itself.93 
Though never cited by a Delaware court,94 this language has commonly 
been used for the proposition that directors have an obligation to make 
decisions that are in the best interest of shareholders.95 
Closer inspection of the opinion, however, reveals a court that was 
unwilling to set aside a decision of Ford’s directors that was alleged to 
advance the interests of the corporation rather than the short-term inter-
ests of its shareholders. Fundamentally, the shareholder complaint 
against the Ford Motor Company sought to accomplish two items: re-
quiring the payment of a special dividend and enjoining Ford from using 
surplus capital to undertake a business expansion.96 While the court sided 
with the plaintiffs on the former request, it refused to approve the latter, 
reversing a lower court decision that had previously enjoined the busi-
ness expansion as being ultra vires.97 In assessing this ultra vires claim, 
the court noted that the claim was best characterized as fiduciary in na-
ture as the plaintiffs alleged that “the whole plan of expansion is inimical 
to shareholders’ rights and was formulated and will be carried out in de-
fiance of those rights.”98 The court then proceeded to assess whether the 
expansion “ought to be enjoined because [it is] inimical to the best inter-
ests of the company and its shareholders.”99 Having reintroduced the in-
terests of “the company” into the legal standard, the court refused to en-
join the expansion in light of the fact that it appeared to be in the long-
term interests of the firm: “It is recognized that plans must often be made 
for a long future, for expected competition, for a continuing as well as an 
immediately profitable venture. The experience of the Ford Motor Com-
pany is evidence of capable management of its affairs.”100 Notably, even 
the order for the company to pay the special dividend of $20,000,000 
                                                            
 93. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 94. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 27 (2012). 
 95. See Smith, supra note 85, at 278. 
 96. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671. 
 97. Id. at 681. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 684. 
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was approved only after the court concluded that the company had failed 
to advance any legitimate business purpose for retaining so much capital 
given the expected capital requirements of the business expansion.101 
Likewise within Delaware jurisprudence, cases that are commonly 
cited for the proposition that directors’ duties run to common stockhold-
ers can easily be read as imposing on directors a duty to maximize the 
value of the firm for which shareholder value is simply a reasonable 
proxy. The much-celebrated Revlon duties provide a case in point. These 
duties impose on directors an “obligation to seek the best value reasona-
bly available for the stockholders where there is a pending sale of con-
trol.”102 Significantly, because these duties only apply when directors are 
selling the entire corporate enterprise,103 basic finance theory dictates that 
maximizing shareholder value should maximize the value of the entire 
firm.104 For this reason, Revlon itself oscillates between describing direc-
tors’ duties as being about the “the maximization of the company’s value 
at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit”105 and about directors simply “get-
ting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”106 
Yet while the foregoing suggests Delaware law has historically 
been amenable to the vision of fiduciary duties articulated in Part III, it 
would be a stretch to say that Delaware law has expressly articulated the 
proper standard for directors to follow when a conflict arises between 
actions that maximize the corporation’s value and those that maximize 
common stockholder value. In part, this reflects the fact that common 
stock value is ordinarily a good proxy for firm value, making such con-
flicts rare. It also reflects the fact that where such conflicts are likely to 
                                                            
 101. Id. at 685. 
 102. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994). 
 103. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (noting 
that Revlon duties apply (i) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell 
itself; (ii) where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks 
an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company; or (iii) when approval of a transac-
tion results in a sale or change of control). 
 104. Under the Miller–Modigliani theorem, the total value of the firm must equal the total 
market value of all of its securities, or in the case of a company with only debt and equity outstand-
ing: Valuefirm = Valuedebt + Valueequity.  Because debt must be paid off or assumed in the sale of a 
company, maximizing Valueequity will yield a transaction that maximizes Valuefirm. To be sure, debt 
can be assumed in a transaction that shifts value from debtholders to shareholders (e.g., where the 
acquiring firm takes on additional debt that stands in parity with the target’s preexisting debt). See 
Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 959 
(1993). The prospect of such acquisitions, however, should result in debt covenants (such as change-
in-control puts) that diminish the possibility of such bondholder-to-stockholder wealth transfers, thus 
ensuring that when a board follows Revlon it will maximize overall firm value. 
 105. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 106. Id. 
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occur, Delaware courts have been notoriously vague regarding the proper 
standard of conduct for directors to follow. 
Especially notable in this regard are those cases addressing direc-
tors’ duties in the so-called “zone of insolvency.” When leveraged firms 
near financial distress, boards must commonly decide between actions 
that benefit creditors (e.g., liquidating a firm with little or no payout to 
stockholders) and those that benefit stockholders (e.g., continuing a firm 
but putting at risk the company’s remaining assets). In a famous foot-
note, Chancellor Allen explicitly recognized this potential conflict in 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications 
Corp.107 Moreover, he seemed to suggest that in such a case, directors’ 
fiduciary obligations would run to the “community of interests that the 
corporation represents” even if the resulting conduct was inconsistent 
with conduct that would maximize returns to stockholders.108 Yet uncer-
tainty lingered after this decision, as courts generally declined creditors’ 
invitations to second-guess director decisions that allegedly harmed cred-
itors while benefiting stockholders when operating in the zone of insol-
vency.109 In 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court sought to clarify the con-
tent of directors’ duties in North American Catholic Educational Pro-
gramming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla.110 However, the court merely 
                                                            
 107. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“[D]irectors will recognize that in managing the busi-
ness affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the 
right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the 
choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the 
corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Brian E. Greer, Fiduciary Duties When the Corporation is in the Zone of Insol-
vency, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2006) (“When a corporation is in the zone of insolvency, the 
case law is unclear as to whether the fiduciary duties of directors and officers shift to creditors (as in 
the case of insolvency) or whether such duties continue to be owed to stockholders as well.”). This 
uncertainty was promoted in no small part by explicit skepticism among some Delaware judges that 
Credit Lyonnais could be used by creditors to bring fiduciary duty claims against directors of a sol-
vent firm. For instance, in Prod. Res. Grp., LLC. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004), 
then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine noted “[t]his view of the common law of corporations is not un-
problematic” and suggested it “involves using the law of fiduciary duty to fill gaps that do not exist” 
in light of the strong covenants generally negotiated by creditors. Id. at 789–90. In a footnote, he 
further emphasized the uncertainty facing directors when operating in the zone of insolvency:  
[T]he real world is . . . likely to generate situations when directors face a difficult choice 
between the pursuit of a plausible, but risky, business strategy that might increase the 
firm’s value to the level that equity holders will receive value, and another course guaran-
teeing no return for equity but preservation of value for creditors.  
Id. at 790 n.57. As such, he “doubt[ed] the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith 
director conduct in the so-called zone.” Id. 
 110. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
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continued to conflate directors’ duties as running to both the “corpora-
tion” and “shareholders.” According to the court, 
[W]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insol-
vency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: direc-
tors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the cor-
poration and its shareholders by exercising their business judg-
ment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholder owners.111 
Not surprisingly, professional commentary following Gheewalla 
has continued to reflect uncertainty with respect to how directors should 
comport themselves in the zone of insolvency when faced with a conflict 
between maximizing firm value and maximizing stockholder value.112 
That said, directors looking to maximize firm value in such settings 
could take some solace in the absence of a clearly articulated standard. 
For the very uncertainty created by courts’ oscillating approach to direc-
tors’ duties would seem to justify viewing courts’ occasional embrace of 
a shareholder wealth maximization norm as merely nonbinding “dic-
                                                            
 111. Id. at 101. Indeed, Gheewalla represents a particularly stark example of an opinion that 
oscillates between depicting directors’ duties as running primarily to the corporation and primarily to 
shareholders. Compare id. at 101 (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration.”), with id. at 100 (“The directors of Delaware corporations have ‘the legal responsibility to 
manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders owners.’”). As suggested 
above in the analysis of board’s Revlon duties, this oscillating approach toward directors’ duties has 
also been prominent in cases articulating these duties in the context of hostile takeovers. In such 
cases, boards have typically justified their use of takeover defenses on the basis that they advance 
the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1990) (describing Time’s justification for its takeover defense 
as rooted in a “belief . . . that Paramount’s bid posed a threat to Time’s control of its own destiny and 
retention of the ‘Time Culture.’”). While the cases can be read to pose a conflict between sharehold-
ers (who seek to realize an immediate acquisition premium) and “the corporation,” they are also 
amenable to an approach that views them as pitting short-term shareholder interests against long-
term shareholder interests. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“Although such considerations [of nonstockholder corporate constituencies 
and interests] may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board 
may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are 
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). The ability for courts to substitute a duty 
“to the corporation” and a duty “to long-term shareholders” has no doubt facilitated courts’ tendency 
to oscillate between articulations of directors’ duties as being “to the corporation” and “to sharehold-
ers.” 
 112. Compare Willett, supra note 18, at 1087 (arguing that the “necessary consequence of 
Gheewalla, construed in light of other relevant authorities, is that where a business strategy may 
generate a return for equity holders, the board must favor that strategy and reject alternatives”), with 
3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1035.60, at 32 n.8 (Supp. 2008) (noting that after Gheewalla, Delaware law 
“hold[s] that duties at or near insolvency are owed both to shareholders and creditors”). 
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ta.”113 The ability to maintain this perspective, however, has changed 
considerably in light of two Delaware cases decided in 2010 and 2013. 
B. Confusing Ends and Means: eBay v. craigslist and In re Trados 
The first case emerged from eBay’s much-followed (and ultimately, 
disastrous) 2004 equity investment in craigslist, Inc.114 Thinking that 
craiglist’s service would be a natural complement to its existing business, 
eBay initially believed that acquiring a significant common stock in-
vestment in craigslist might facilitate either an acquisition of the compa-
ny or, alternatively, provide eBay with valuable knowledge it could use 
to launch its own competing site.115 Ultimately, eBay and craigslist’s two 
existing directors and majority stockholders—Craig Newmark and James 
Buckmaster—agreed to allow eBay to acquire 28.4% of the company’s 
outstanding common stock, subject to a variety of additional terms.116 
Among other things, these additional terms required the board to consist 
of three directors to be elected by cumulative voting (thus guaranteeing 
the board would consist of an eBay director as well as Buckmaster and 
Newmark) and also addressed the effect of eBay forming a competing 
listing service. Specifically, were eBay to compete directly with 
craigslist, the parties agreed eBay would lose certain stockholder veto 
rights it held over various corporate actions (such as the right to veto the 
authorization of additional shares of capital stock) as well as its preemp-
tive rights over the issuance of any additional shares.117 
Shortly after its investment, eBay quickly came to the realization 
that Newmark and Buckmaster had no intention of ever selling 
craigslist—at least not so long as Newmark and Buckmaster remained 
among the living and in control of the company.118 eBay thereupon fo-
cused on developing a rival service, Kijiji, which it launched in the Unit-
ed States in 2007.119 Although the investment agreements clearly con-
templated such a scenario, they did not, however, contemplate the incen-
tive this move would have on Newmark and Buckmaster’s desire to end 
its relationship with eBay. Shortly after the U.S. launch of Kijiji, 
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Buckmaster asked eBay to “gracefully unwind the relationship,”120 citing 
negative feedback craigslist had received from its users regarding the 
relationship in the wake of Kijiji’s launch. He also cited significant cul-
tural differences. As summarized by the court, 
[Buckmaster] . . . explained that craigslist did not think in terms 
of competition, but it was clear that eBay did, which made 
craigslist uncomfortable because eBay was a large stockholder 
privy to craigslist financials and other nonpublic information.121 
When eBay rebuffed any discussion of unwinding their position, 
Newmark and Buckmaster commenced a strategy to preclude eBay from 
appointing a director, while locking eBay into a powerless minority posi-
tion. 
In general, their strategy rested on a three-pronged approach that 
was made possible, in part, by the automatic termination of eBay’s 
stockholder veto rights upon the launch of Kijiji.122 First, the company 
adopted a staggered board, thereby making it impossible for eBay to use 
cumulative voting to elect a director representative.123 Second, the com-
pany offered all three stockholders the right to receive one newly issued 
share of common stock for every five shares then held if the stockholder 
executed a right of first refusal agreement in favor of craiglist.124 Alt-
hough Newmark and Buckmaster signed the agreement, eBay refused, 
causing its ownership interest to drop from 28.4% to 24.9%.125 This dilu-
tion made it impossible for eBay to elect a director even without a stag-
gered board.126 Finally, craigslist adopted a shareholder rights plan that 
would be triggered if any stockholder other than eBay, Newmark or 
Buckmaster acquired more than 15% of the company’s common stock.127 
Even without signing the right of first refusal, this last provision locked 
eBay into a minority position with a significant constraint on its ability to 
transfer its stock. 
eBay challenged all three measures as being in violation of the fi-
duciary duties Newmark and Buckmaster—as directors and controlling 
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stockholders—owed to eBay.128 In an opinion written by Chancellor Wil-
liam Chandler, the court ultimately upheld the staggered board but struck 
down the stock issuance and the shareholder rights plan. For present pur-
poses, Chandler’s analysis of the rights plan is especially relevant. Ac-
cording to Chandler, the rights plan was distinctive because the usual 
concern about such plans being used to entrench management against the 
threat of a hostile takeover did not apply. Given their significant stock-
holdings, Newmark and Buckmaster already had sufficient power to pre-
vent a hostile takeover and guarantee themselves board membership.129 
Yet Chandler nonetheless applied Unocal’s intermediate level of review, 
which required him to assess whether the rights plan was a reasonable 
response to a perceived threat to craiglist’s corporate policy and effec-
tiveness.130 In so doing, Chandler effectively framed the issue as one 
where the board was arguably choosing to advance the corporation’s in-
terests over those of its stockholder, eBay. 
The central issue faced by Chandler was that Newmark and 
Buckmaster justified their use of the rights plan by pointing to the threat 
an eBay acquisition posed to craigslist’s corporate culture. As summa-
rized by Chandler, 
[Newmark and Buckmaster] contend that they identified a threat 
to craigslist and its corporate policies that will materialize after 
they both die and their craigslist shares are distributed to their 
heirs. At that point, they say, “eBay’s acquisition of control [via 
the anticipated acquisition of Newmark’s or Buckmaster’s shares 
from some combination of their heirs] would fundamentally alter 
craigslist’s values, culture and business model, including depart-
ing from [craigslist’s] public-service mission in favor of in-
creased monetization of craigslist.”131 
Chandler recognized that this argument was a clear attempt to fit within 
the scope of Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,132 which had 
previously approved a board’s use of takeover defenses as a good faith 
effort to protect a specific corporate culture.133 Chandler distinguished 
Time, however, by emphasizing that “Time did not hold that corporate 
culture, standing alone, is worthy of protection as an end in itself.”134 
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Rather, Chandler continued, the nonstockholder considerations that were 
tolerated in Time were limited to those that “must lead at some point to 
value for stockholders.”135 Here, Newmark and Buckmaster “did not 
make any serious attempt to prove that the craigslist culture, which re-
jects any attempt to further monetize its services, translates into in-
creased profitability for stockholders.”136 As such, their effort to advance 
the corporation’s long-term interests failed Unocal’s test because they 
“failed to prove that craigslist possesses a palpable, distinctive, and ad-
vantageous culture that sufficiently promotes stockholder value to sup-
port the indefinite implementation of a poison pill.”137 
Notwithstanding this emphasis on stockholder value, it is important 
to emphasize that the decision as a whole is entirely consistent with the 
argument that fiduciary duties are fundamentally about maximizing firm 
value. For instance, Chandler made it clear several times that the flaw 
with Newmark and Buckmaster’s “culture” argument was that the 
craigslist culture did not maximize firm value in the conventional sense 
used in corporate finance: 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist direc-
tors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accom-
pany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the 
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers. . . . Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of imple-
menting the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, 
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic val-
ue of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.138 
In this regard, the case resembles other Delaware cases that speak simul-
taneously of duties that require maximizing stockholder value and duties 
that require maximizing the value of the corporation. 
Yet the case also takes things one step further. Arguably, the most 
straightforward summary of the entire dispute is that Newmark and 
Buckmaster were simply seeking to maintain their private benefits of 
control rather than maximize the economic value of the firm. As direc-
tors, they were therefore trying to opt out of the default norm of maxim-
izing stockholder returns in favor of maximizing their own private bene-
fits. Indeed, Chandler sees as much: 
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[Newmark and Buckmaster] simply disliked the possibility that 
the Grim Reaper someday will catch up with them and that a 
company like eBay might, in the future, purchase a controlling 
interest in craigslist. They considered this possible future state 
unpalatable, not because of how it affects the value of the entity 
for its stockholders, but rather because of their own personal 
preferences.139 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, Chandler declines to 
view the case as simply a duty of loyalty problem and to call foul on the 
directors for impermissibly opting out of the norm of maximizing stock-
holder value for personal gain.140 Instead, he opts to employ Unocal re-
view, where he depicts the goal of maximizing stockholder value as the 
ultimate, immutable benchmark by which to evaluate director conduct.141 
His stated rationale for applying this standard of review is especially tell-
ing in this regard. Even though the rights plan created no risk of board 
entrenchment, he nevertheless concluded that Delaware courts will apply 
Unocal to guard against both “the overt risk of entrenchment” and the 
“less visible, yet more pernicious risk that incumbents acting in subjec-
tive good faith might nevertheless deprive stockholders of value-
maximizing opportunities.”142 Here, Chandler seems to be inviting en-
hanced review of not just those board decisions that, while made in good 
faith, fail to maximize stockholder value and therefore fail to maximize 
corporate value (arguably the issue in eBay). He also seems to be inviting 
review of those good faith decisions that maximize firm value but “de-
prive stockholders of value-maximizing opportunities.”143 Directors have 
no choice, it would seem, but to always prioritize stockholder value in 
exercising their residual control rights. 
This articulation of director duties was made even clearer in another 
case that was simultaneously proceeding through the Delaware courts. 
Eventually decided in 2013, In re Trados Incorporated Shareholder Liti-
gation144 presented the all-too-familiar dilemma of a VC-backed start-up 
that neither succeeded nor failed, but simply went sideways. Over the 
course of 2000 through 2003, the company undertook several rounds of 
venture capital finance such that by 2004, the company had outstanding 
seven series of preferred stock having an aggregate liquidation prefer-
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ence of approximately $58 million.145 As is typical of VC financings, the 
multiple rounds of finance led to a board structure heavily influenced by 
designees of the company’s VC investors. Among the company’s seven 
directors, two were company executives, three were principals of the VC 
investors, one was a preferred stock investor with close personal ties to 
one of the VC directors, and one was an independent industry expert.146 
At the center of the legal dispute was the sale of the company in 
2005 to a strategic buyer for $60 million.147 In 2004, the board instructed 
management to find a buyer for the company given its meager growth 
prospects, knowing that the proceeds of any such sale were likely to be 
absorbed by the preferred stock’s $58 million of liquidation prefer-
ences.148 Moreover, given that company management held only common 
stock, the board also approved a management incentive plan (MIP) that 
entitled select executives to a percentage of any acquisition proceeds.149 
In light of the paltry proceeds common stockholders were likely to re-
ceive in an acquisition, the MIP was viewed as necessary to incentivize 
management to find a buyer.150 The combination of the preferred stock 
liquidation preferences and the MIP, however, ensured that common 
stockholders received nothing in Trados’s eventual sale.151 Common 
stockholders sued, alleging that the board violated its fiduciary duties by 
choosing to sell the company and adopt the MIP rather than continuing to 
operate Trados in an effort to generate value for the company’s common 
stockholders.152 
In an opinion authored by Chancellor Travis Laster, the Delaware 
Chancery Court ultimately held that the board was not liable.153 Howev-
er, in the course of reaching this conclusion, Laster highlighted a number 
of problems with the board’s decisionmaking. Citing eBay, he began 
with articulating the “standard of conduct” of directors, noting the usual 
duty “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stock-
holders.”154 Getting to the crux of the issue, Laster then analyzed how a 
director’s duty should be viewed when—as in this case—directors under-
took actions that benefited preferred stock and not common stock. Cen-
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tral to Laster’s resolution of this question were two cases in which Dela-
ware courts refused to enjoin board action that allegedly benefited com-
mon stockholders at the expense of preferred stockholders.155 Both courts 
concluded that, as between choosing actions that advance the interests of 
preferred stock and actions that advance the interests of common stock, 
directors should favor the latter. According to Laster: 
Put differently, “generally it will be the duty of the board, where 
discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests 
of the common stock—as the good faith judgment of the board 
sees them to be—to the interests created by the special rights, 
preferences, etc . . . of preferred stock.” . . . . Consequently, as 
this court observed at the motion to dismiss stage, “in circum-
stances where the interests of the common stockholders diverge 
from those of the preferred stockholders, it is possible that a di-
rector could breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests 
of the preferred stockholders over those of the common stock-
holders.”156 
Having established this standard of conduct, Laster next proceeded 
to determine the appropriate standard of review. Since a majority of di-
rectors had a material financial interest in the acquisition, Laster applied 
entire fairness.157 In examining the first prong of fair dealing, Laster 
found overwhelming the evidence suggesting the board consistently dis-
regarded common stockholder interests as it sought to secure and then 
execute the acquisition.158 In particular, he faulted the VC designees for 
not evaluating Trados “from the perspective of the common stockhold-
ers, but rather as holders of preferred stock with contractual cash flow 
rights that diverged materially from those of common stock . . . .”159 He 
also faulted directors for not considering how to treat common stock-
holders fairly in designing the MIP and for failing to form a special 
committee to represent the interests of common stockholders.160 Director 
approval of the transaction was therefore problematic because the “de-
fendants in this case did not understand that their job was to maximize 
the value of the corporation for the benefit of the common stockholders, 
and they refused to recognize the conflicts they faced.”161 Fortunately for 
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the defendants, the plaintiffs’ expert provided a valuation of Trados’s 
common stock based largely on a comparable company analysis that 
Laster found unrealistic.162 He therefore deferred to the defendants’ ex-
pert, whose more thorough valuation revealed that the common stock had 
no economic value.163 Since using this value for common stock meant 
that common stockholders received fair value, common stockholders 
“received the substantial equivalent in value of what they had before, and 
the Merger satisfies the test of fairness.”164 
Thus, even more so than in eBay, Laster’s vision of directors’ fidu-
ciary duties is one in which all directors have an immutable obligation to 
maximize value for common stockholders. Significantly, this obligation 
exists even when investors negotiate in advance to have specific board 
representatives, as occurred with Trados. While Laster cites prior cases 
in advancing this vision, no prior ruling had so clearly stated that all di-
rectors—even those elected solely by preferred stockholders—had as 
their “job” the advancement of common stockholder interests when they 
might conflict with those of the preferred.165 Notably, neither of the two 
cases cited by Laster for this proposition involved boards where pre-
ferred stockholders had director representatives. Equity-Linked Investors, 
LP v. Adams,166 for instance, involved a similar situation as Trados in 
that the board faced a choice between liquidating a struggling firm 
(which would benefit preferred stockholders due to their liquidation 
preferences) and continuing the firm with borrowed funds (which would 
benefit common stockholders).167 In contrast to Trados, however, the 
company’s seven member board consisted of only management and out-
side directors; the preferred stock investors did not have any right to a 
designee.168 The opinion’s holding that directors should use their discre-
tionary judgment to prefer the interests of common stockholders is thus 
consistent with the bargaining model of the board. Under this model, di-
rectors have by default a duty to maximize stockholder welfare as a 
means to maximize the value of the firm, but investors are free to de-
mand board representation to ensure that investors’ potentially unique 
financial interests can be given voice in board deliberations. Under 
Trados’s depiction of the board, however, an investor-designee’s attempt 
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to voice at the board his or her investor’s unique financial interests would 
appear to be fraught with peril. 
As with eBay, adhering to a bargaining model of the board would 
not necessarily have changed the outcome of the case. Under the bargain-
ing model, investors are free to designate directors to advance their fi-
nancial claims in board deliberations, but directors remain bound to their 
fiduciary duty to the corporation to facilitate Coasian bargaining. As 
such, the problem with the Trados board was not that its VC directors 
sought to advance the financial interests of their VC funds, but that no 
one on the board considered a surplus-generating bargain that might in-
duce the VC investors to continue the firm. Even if unlikely, this possi-
bility should have at least been raised by the non-VC designees given 
what this Article argues is their default duty to maximize common stock-
holder value.169 Yet even the board’s one independent director “volun-
teered that the Trados directors never considered the common stockhold-
ers.”170 Instead, the only bargaining that occurred was with respect to the 
MIP—a bargain initiated only after the decision to sell the firm had been 
made.171 
The ultimate consequences of Delaware’s move in this direction are 
potentially profound. As a matter of private ordering, Trados’s view of 
the board can be expected to induce investors to contract specifically for 
more events to address an unknown future rather than to rely on board 
representation. Indeed, new contract provisions have already emerged 
within the venture capital community that are designed to address Trados 
by giving preferred stockholders the right to compel a company’s acqui-
sition regardless of the board’s judgment.172 Aside from the questionable 
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enforceability of such provisions, the idea that investors must turn entire-
ly to explicit contracting to address possible future states of the world 
obviously does little to address investors’ incomplete contracting chal-
lenge. More troublesome still is the potential for Trados to affect board 
behavior in certain settings. Recall that the Trados board ultimately es-
caped liability only because of the plaintiff’s poor choice of valuation 
expert—a point unlikely to be lost on other boards and their advisors. 
Because more sophisticated, option-theoretic models can reveal positive 
common stock value even in distressed settings,173 boards faced with the 
dilemma of whether to continue or liquidate a struggling firm may now 
have to take seriously decisions that might maximize stockholder value 
but not firm value. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Drawing on incomplete contracting theory, this Article has ad-
vanced a bargaining model of the board to illustrate how the use of con-
stituency directors in both privately held and publicly traded firms can 
represent an efficient mechanism for boards to maximize firm value. 
Moreover, while directors’ fiduciary duties have generally been omitted 
from formal incomplete contracting models, this Article has also demon-
strated why imposing on directors a fiduciary duty to the corporation can 
facilitate this goal through reducing the risk of dysfunctional ex post bar-
gaining within the board of directors. Yet for the model to function in 
this fashion, any related obligation for directors to maximize common 
stockholder value must represent merely a default rule that investors can 
opt out of through appointing their own director-designees. 
While decisions such as eBay and Trados have called into question 
whether shareholder wealth maximization can be characterized in this 
fashion, close inspection of Delaware case law suggests both decisions 
are in tension with long-standing doctrine concerning the standard of 
conduct for Delaware directors. As doctrinal innovations, these decisions 
risk undermining the utility of the corporate form as a vehicle for maxim-
izing firm value, potentially inducing investors and entrepreneurs to turn 
to noncorporate entities to finance new business enterprises or deterring 
investment altogether.174 To ensure the continuing vitality of the corpo-
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rate form, Delaware courts should, accordingly, abandon any pretense 
that corporate directors have an immutable duty to maximize stockholder 
value. Instead, courts should revert to their traditional focus on policing 
against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use direc-
tors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in 
corporate finance. 
                                                                                                                                     
notes 46–51 (discussing how granting entrepreneur all residual control rights may violate investor’s 
participation constraint). 
